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Abstract
Can the availability of poorly-designed government insurance alter technology adoption decisions? A theoretical model of technology adoption and insurance incentive effects for a high- and low-risk technology is developed and explored empirically using a unique dataset of skip-row agronomic trial data. A multivariate nonparametric resampling technique is developed, which
augments the trial data with a larger dataset of conventional yields to improve estimation efficiency. Skip-row adoption is found
to increase mean yields and reduce risk in areas prone to drought. RMA insurance rules have incentive-distorting impacts which
disincentivize skip-row adoption.
Keywords: Adverse selection, federal Crop Insurance, insurance design, insurance pricing, nonparametric methods, risk management, skip-row corn, technology adoption, yield risk

this context. This question is of great importance in
crop insurance markets, as the provision of poorlydesigned government insurance may have the potential to disincentivize the adoption of otherwise
optimal technologies, to the detriment of both the
government and the adopters.
A particular market of interest in this respect is
skip-row corn in the Central Great Plains under the
Federal Crop Insurance Program. Producers of dryland crops in areas of low rainfall sometimes employ what are known as skip-row planting patterns;
this is done by skipping rows when planting. Skiprow practices may better facilitate the maintenance
of soil moisture throughout the growing season
via inter-temporal rationing, as the crop root system is only able to reach the moisture in the skipped
rows later in the growing season–rows which oth-

Introduction
It has long been recognized that in the presence of
information asymmetries, the availability of insurance can alter otherwise optimal behavior after the
insurance purchase, and also that the availability of
mispriced insurance can alter the type and amount
of insurance purchased (see e.g. Arrow 1963; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Akerlof 1970; Hölmstrom
1979). Although their roots are similar, the former
is referred to as moral hazard, while the latter is referred to as adverse selection. The applications of
these concepts to questions in insurance markets are
numerous. However, one related question that has
received less attention is how alternative government insurance market/product designs can impact
the technology adoption decisions of producers in
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erwise would have been exhausted if planted and
not skipped. The crop physiological characteristics
of skip-row suggest that there is a potential for this
practice to outperform conventional fully-planted
practices when moisture conditions are less than optimal, and vice-versa when conditions are favorable
(see e.g. Lyon et al. 2009; Palic et al. 2008; Whish et
al. 2005; Abunyewa 2008).
Skip-row patterns have been used historically in
several regions and crops with some success (e.g.
Texas cotton), and have recently gained some popularity in the Central Great Plains for corn (Pavlista
et al. 2010) and grain sorghum (Abunyewa 2008). Yet
the slow adoption of skip-row in the Central Great
Plains has given rise to several questions regarding
whether the practice is indeed beneficial from a production standpoint–in terms of impact on expected
yields, yield risk, and net returns–and if so, how it
should be properly treated in insurance contexts. The
latter is quite important since the presence of the insurance market could have behavior-altering incentive effects regarding technology adoption decisions.
If the insurance products are not properly designed
and/or rated, or if the structure of the insurance market is such that one technology is favored over another in terms of coverage or relative pricing, then
situations can arise where an otherwise optimal technology choice may be altered.
This study contributes to our understanding of the
effects of government insurance programs on technology adoption. The paper also presents a novel empirical framework for integrating experimental trial
data on new technologies with data from existing
technologies in order to generate improved estimates
of the production distribution of the new technology.
To accomplish this, a theoretical model is first developed to investigate the impact of alternative government insurance program designs on technology
adoption decisions using the case of skip-row corn
in the Central Great Plains as a motivating application. Next, the skip-row rules from the Risk Management Agency (RMA) are investigated and reviewed;
the RMA is charged with administering the Federal Crop Insurance Program. An empirical model is
then developed to assess the characteristics of skiprow corn relative to conventional practices, focusing
on both yield distribution impacts and implications
for technology adoption. Specifically, three questions are addressed. First, in the absence of insurance,
which technology (skip-row or conventional) would
be optimal from the perspective of a risk-averse producer? Second, have the past and present RMA skiprow insurance rules crowded out skip-row adoption?
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And third, are the production characteristics of the
two practices substantially similar enough to warrant being combined as a single insurable practice as
they are under current RMA rules, or should they be
maintained as separate insurable practices in order
to avoid incentive distortions that impact technology
adoption?
Since skip-row practices are relatively new to
the Central Great Plains, data are limited. To alleviate this problem, a unique dataset of side-by-side
skip-row corn agronomic trial data (N=270) are augmented with a large farm-unit level dataset consisting of 130,080 conventional corn yield observations
from 1996-2008 by employing a novel multivariate
nonparametric simulation technique to derive skiprow yield distributions and insurance rates. Applying this technique allows for a more efficient estimation of yield distributions in different locations under
the new skip-row technology since the resulting estimates will embody a wider spectrum of possible
weather events. To our knowledge, this is the first
such attempt at exploiting this nature of side-by-side
trial data on new crop technologies in order to obtain
augmented yield distribution estimates. Using these
simulated distributions, analysis of a representative
producer is performed to evaluate the impacts of various insurance regimes on skip-row adoption.
We find that the optimal technology adoption decision depends critically on the design of the government’s insurance market, and in extreme cases,
a poorly-designed insurance system can completely
crowd out the adoption of an otherwise optimal technology. Specifically, this study finds that the adoption of skip-row technologies results in substantial
increases in expected yields in the regions and crops
under consideration. The adoption of skip-row cropping also substantially limits the frequency and severity of yield losses, and results in fair premium reductions in excess of 50% in typical cases. Empirical
analysis suggests that current and former RMA skiprow insurance rules have incentive-distorting impacts that effectively crowd out skip-row adoption,
suggesting that it may be more appropriate to treat
skip-row cropping as a separate insurable practice as
opposed to pooling the practices. Practical implementation considerations are also discussed.
Theoretical Model - Insurance Design and Technology Adoption
Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), consider
a risk-averse expected utility maximizing producer

S k i p -R o w C r o p I n s u r a n c e P r o g r a m D e s i g n , I n c e n t i v e E f f e c t s ,

with utility function U(x), where x is end-of-period
return, U′(x) > 0, and U′′(x) < 0. Suppose there are two
technologies available, an existing high-risk technology and a newer low-risk technology, where yE,L and yN,L
are the returns to the existing and new technologies,
respectively, in the low-yielding state, both occurring simultaneously and with probability p, and yE,H
and yN,H are the returns in the high-yielding state, occurring with probability (1−p). Further assume that
yN,H = yE,H – γp/(1 – p), and yN,L = yE,L + γ, where

(yE,H – yE,L)/[1 + p/(1 – p)] > γ > 0 holds, so that
yN,H > yN,L. Thus, the new technology outperforms the
existing technology in the low-yielding state, and underperforms in the high-yielding state. We assume
the producer either adopts the new technology or
not. It follows that
E(yN) = pyE,L + (1 – p)yE,H

p
= (1 – p) yE,H –γ1 – p + p(yE,L + γ)

(

)

= E(yE) = y‾
That is, the two technologies have the same expected return. It is also obvious that the new technology embodies lower risk since in both states the
absolute difference between returns to the new technology and the mean return are less than for the existing technology. Thus, the existing technology is
a mean-preserving spread of the new technology
(variance is also easily calculated to verify this). This
situation mirrors the potential case for skip-row
corn.
It is a simple exercise to show that in the absence
of insurance, since U′(x)>0 and U′′(x)<0, the new
technology would always be adopted except in the
trivial case of p=0, where the producer is indifferent. Of interest here is the expected utility maximizing technology choice in the presence of alternative
insurance programs. Here, we depart from classic equilibrium analyses such as those contained in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), which analyze competitive market equilibrium outcomes, and instead
focus on the expected utility maximizing insurance
choices and technology adoption decisions under
various government insurance program designs.
The reason for this departure is that in the case of
Federal Crop Insurance, the design and rating of the
insurance offerings are a priori independent of the
subsequent insurance purchases since the government must offer all insurances in the menu of contracts published, regardless of whether the offering
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of such contracts results in expected underwriting
losses to the government. Thus the concepts of insurance market equilibrium take a less central role
in the case of non-competitively offered government
insurance. Also, insurance prices/rates are not set
in equilibrium, but are rather predetermined by the
government agency based on historical data. However, the government can determine how it chooses
to use such data and how to structure the insurance market and products. Thus, in analyzing market outcomes here, it is sufficient to analyze the
insured’s insurance purchase and technology adoption decisions given alternative exogenously-determined government insurance program designs.
We consider two relevant cases. In the first case, it
is assumed that both technologies are insurable, that
insurance is offered at the actuarially fair cost of insurance of the existing technology, and that the insurance indemnifies in an amount equal to the actual
loss below expected return. As further discussed below, this case mirrors that which exists for skiprow adoption under current RMA insurance rules,
whereby both practices are pooled in the same insurance program. We show that adoption of the new
technology would be completely crowded out in this
case because of the design of the insurance market,
and specifically, due to how insurance rates are determined by the government. The second case mirrors that which would exist under our proposed new
rules for skip-row insurance.
Explicitly, in the low-yielding state, the indemnities paid under the existing and new technologies
are IE,L = y‾ − yE,L and IN,L = y‾ – yN,L, and in the highyielding state, indemnities are zero. Insurance is offered for both technologies at the actuarially fair insurance price of the existing technology, rE = p(y‾ – yE,L).
Employing a standard expected utility framework,
we can write expected utility under each technology
as EUE = pU(yE,L − rE + IE,L) + (1 − p) U(yE,H − rE), and
EUN = pU(yN,L − rE + IN,L) + (1 − p) U(yN,H − rE). We can
evaluate technology adoption decisions by evaluating whether EUE is greater than, equal to, or less than
EUN, or indeterminate. Substituting and eliminating
terms, we have
EUE – EUN = (1 – p) U( J1) – (1 – p) U( J2),
where

J1 = (p – p2) yE,L + (p2 – p + 1) yE,H

and
J2 = −[(p3 − 2p2 + p)yE,L + (−p3 + 2p2 − 2p + 1)yE,H − γp]
( p − 1)

826
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Since U′(x) > 0, it is sufficient to show that J1 − J2 > 0 to
establish that EUE > EUN (i.e. to establish that the existing technology will be adopted in lieu of the new
technology under mispriced insurance). Straightforward but tedious algebra reveals that
J1 − J2 = –γ

p
> 0
p–1

Thus, under such an insurance program design,
adoption of the new technology would be completely
crowded-out.1 The implication is that in the case of
pooled insurance, all producers will find it advantageous to adopt the high risk technology. Here we derive the result assuming the insurance rate is equal to
that of the actuarially fair rate for the high risk technology, but it is easily shown that this result is true
regardless of the level of the rate, as long as the rate
is identical for high and low risk, and feasible for the
producer to purchase in the high risk case.
In the second case, it is assumed that both technologies are insurable, that insurance is offered for each
technology at their respective actuarially fair costs (i.e.
the insurance markets for each technology are separate), rE = p(y‾ – yE,L) and rN = p(y‾ – yN,L), and that the
insurance again indemnifies in an amount equal to
the loss below expected return. We can then write expected utility under each technology as
EŨ E = pU(yE,L – rE + IE,L) + (1 – p) U(yE,H – rE),
and EŨ N = pU(yN,L – rN + IN,L) + (1 – p) U(yN,H – rN).
Again, we can evaluate technology adoption decisions by evaluating EŨ E – EŨ N. Subtracting and substituting, we have
EŨ E – EŨ N = (1 – p) U( J1) – (1 – p)U( J2 + γp)
where

– pU( J3 + γp) + pU( J3)
J3 = (2p − p2)yE,L + (p2 − 2p + 1)yE,H .

Since

−(γp2)/(

J1 − (J2 + γp) =
and
(J2 + γp) – J3 >
lim
γ→

yE,H – yE,L

p− 1) > 0,

[(J2 + γp) – J3 ]

1 + p/(1 – p)

= (p – p2) yE,H – (p – p2)yE,L > γp > 0 ,
it follows that J1 > J2 + γp > J3 + γp > J3, and that the
relationship between EŨ E and EŨ N is indeterminate
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on this basis. However, we can rely on the assumption that U′′(x)<0 to argue that the new technology is
strictly preferred under this insurance regime by simply showing that the insured net returns under the
existing technology are a mean-preserving spread
of the returns under the new technology. Clearly,
the expected insured net returns for both technologies are equal since the insurance is priced actuarially fair. Thus, all that is required to prove a mean
preserving spread is to show that the net insured return to the new technology in the low-yielding state,
R̃ N,L, is greater than the net insured return to the existing technology in the low-yielding state, R̃ E,L, and
vice-versa in the high-yielding state. Straightforward calculations show that R̃ N,L – R̃ E,L = γp > 0, and
R̃ E,H – R̃ N,H = γp2/(p – 1) > 0. Thus, net insured returns for the new technology second order stochastic
dominate insured returns under the existing technology when insurance is priced fairly, and thus a riskaverse expected utility maximizing producer will
adopt the new technology.
If we allow for relative insurance subsidies (which
favor the higher risk technology), allow for differences in expected yields and distributional shape,
and/or allow for mispriced insurance across producers, then the results of the theoretical results presented above are indeterminate and will depend on
the specific utility function, level of risk aversion, levels of subsidization, and the resulting yield distributions. Thus, whether the skip-row technology case in
our application would sufficiently conform to the theoretical results above is ultimately an empirical question that we investigate below. First, however, we
provide additional context about the insurance rules
for skip-row corn currently in use by RMA and the
expected yield distribution impacts.
Skip Row Insurance Program Background
Prior to the 2008 crop year, RMA did not offer
skip-row corn insurance to producers via the regular
insurance program, but only under restrictive written
agreements. Starting in 2008, RMA began offering insurance for skip-row corn in selected counties in Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska without a written agreement, subject to specific requirements. Under the 2008
rules, RMA required producers to insure their skiprow crops separately from conventionally-planted
crops, and to maintain separate yield databases. In

1. It is well-accepted that government insurance programs should seek to replicate what would happen in an unfettered and/or competitive market in the absence of intervention. Thus, we say that the adoption of the new technology is “crowded-out” in this case since it is the existence of
the mispriced insurance that is precluding adoption.

S k i p -R o w C r o p I n s u r a n c e P r o g r a m D e s i g n , I n c e n t i v e E f f e c t s ,

addition, RMA used the Farm Service Agency (FSA)
percentage acreage factors to determine the number of acres planted to the crop for insurance purposes. The FSA percentage acreage factors were intended to determine planted acreage for fields using
skip row patterns by taking into account the proportion of skipped rows; they work simply by multiplying the number of actual acres planted by the factor
in order to obtain the adjusted planted acreage. For
example, if 100 acres of land were skip-row planted,
it would be recorded and treated as having 100 × 0.5
= 50 acres planted. In terms of calculating yield (or
production per acre), if 10,000 bushels of corn were
actually produced on those 100 acres of land, the factored yield would be calculated as 10,000 ÷ (100 ×
0.5) = 200 bu./acre, whereas the conventional calculation would have been simply 10,000 ÷ 100 = 100 bu./
acre. In addition, new skip-row producers’ purchasing insurance for allowable skip-row patterns under the 2008 rules were required to use Transitional
Yields (T-Yields) to establish their initial insurance
guarantee (known as Actual Production History, or
APH). However, the T-Yields were not factored into
the APH determination. This resulted in producers
effectively receiving coverage for half of the T-Yield
APH, and at approximately half of the effective premium rate. Except under very unrealistic distribution
assumptions, the fair premium associated with half
of any given level of coverage will typically be much
lower than half of the premium associated with that
level of coverage.
At the time, there was concern that the use of these
factors unfairly penalized producers adopting skiprow technologies since the insurance guarantees were
reduced, and that this was disincentivizing producers
from adopting skip-row cropping (Palic et al. 2008).
From an economic perspective, this is troubling since
the unfair provision of insurance across practices/
technologies may have been crowding out the adoption of skip-row technology.
Starting in 2009, RMA announced new rules for
skip-row corn in the region. In addition to expanding skip-row coverage to more counties, RMA announced that the FSA-planted acreage factors would
no longer be employed, and that skip-row and conventional planted crops would be pooled together
as a single insurable practice. Still, concerns remain
that skip-row and conventional practices may not
embody the same risk profile and production capabilities. From an economic and actuarial standpoint,
combining significantly dissimilar risks into the same
insurance product opens the door for mispricing
risks, adverse selection, and other market distortions

and
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Table 1. Summary of RMA Skip-Row Corn Insurance Rules
		
Coverage

Premium Rate
Determination

FSA
Factors

Pre-2008 Rules

N/A

N/A

N/A

2008 Rules

Separate

Pooled

Yes

2009/Current
Rules

Pooled

Pooled

No

Proposed
Rules

Separate

Separate

No

This table provides a summary of RMA rules for skip-row
corn in eligible counties in the Central Great Plains. “Coverage” refers to whether skip-row and conventional practices
are insured under the same/pooled or separate policies. “Premium Rate Determination” refers to whether the premium
rate for the insured crop is the same/pooled for both skiprow and conventional practices, or if rates are maintained
and determined separately by practice. “FSA Factors” refers
to whether or not FSA factors are used to determine skip-row
acreage for yield and rate determination purposes.

if the inappropriate provision of the insurance alters
otherwise optimal behaviors. These issues are important from an economic perspective as, generally, government insurance programs should seek to replicate
how an unfettered market would perform in similar
situations, and thus should avoid crowding out innovations which otherwise would be adopted in the
absence of such programs unless explicitly intended
(Jaffee 2006; Woodard et al. 2011). If the production
characteristics among practices are significantly different–and if feasible from an operational perspective–then treating skip-row and conventionallyplanted practices as separate insurable practices may
be warranted. Thus, we propose that RMA should
consider maintaining coverage and rates for skip-row
separately from conventional practices/technologies,
and should not employ the FSA factors since they artificially lower coverage in some instances and add
unnecessary complications in others. A summary of
past and current RMA rules and our proposed rule
are provided in Table 1.
Production Impacts of Skip-Row Technology and
Implications for Insurance
As noted, there is a potential for skip-row corn to
outperform conventionally-planted corn when moisture conditions are less than optimal. Likewise, conventionally-planted crops may tend to have higher
yields when weather conditions are favorable. This
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suggests two potential impacts due to skip-row adoption that are relevant for insurance: impacts on average production capabilities (i.e. the mean, or expected
yield), and impacts on yield risk (i.e. insurance costs,
variance, and other higher order moments). Accordingly, the adoption of skip-row will have two primary impacts on its actuarial profile versus conventional practices. The first is the impact on the APH,
the measure used to determine insurance guarantees.
APH equals the average of the last four to ten years of
farm-unit data. The second impact is on the expected
insurance losses.
Recall that under the current 2009 RMA rules,
skip-row and conventional practices are insured together and assigned a common APH and insurance
rate. Whether the expected changes in risk and expected yields from using skip-row patterns relative
to conventional patterns are such that they justify
the use of the same APH guarantee and rating structure (i.e. schedule of insurance rates) is an empirical
question. Because skip-row corn may have higher or
lower expected yields on average, if the APH is established for conventionally-planted corn but applied to skip-row insured corn, the APH may be biased up or down. This may result in artificially high
(or low) insured APH’s for skip-row, and subsequently may impact indemnities under any particular
loss event. Second, even independent of skip-row impacts on APH, skip-row cropping may also embody a
lower risk of insured loss. Thus, skip-row may have
lower expected insurance losses relative to conventional losses for any given level of equivalent bushel/
acre coverage. If not properly accounted for, these insurance coverage and rate effects have the potential
to impact technology adoption and lead to adverse
planting incentives.
To provide context, Figure 1 presents agronomic
trial data from Lyon et al. (2009) of matched skiprow and conventionally-planted corn yields for selected counties in the Central Great Plains. The data
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Table 2. Summary Statistics-Agronomic Trial Data
Conventional
Mean
Standard Deviation
Semi-Variance
1st Percentile Yield
5th Percentile Yield
10th Percentile Yield
Median
90th Percentile Yield
95th Percentile Yield
99th Percentile Yield

95.427
47.979
1197.244
2.090
17.047
23.149
97.024
155.876
173.656
194.240

Skip-Row
92.530
39.770
823.063
10.047
21.986
40.084
96.069
145.839
154.968
170.438

This table presents summary statistics for skip-row and conventional matched yields (N=270) from Lyon et al. (2009). The
correlation between skip-row and conventionally-planted
yields was 0.954.

were collected from 2004-2006 from 23 trials conducted in Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado; several
measures were taken to ensure that the data are extensible over the region.2 In Figure 1, the conventionally-planted yield outcome (bu./acre) is plotted on the x-axis, while the corresponding skip-row
yield is on the y-axis (N = 270 observations). The
dashed line is a 45° line emanating from the origin.
The solid line is a trend line from an OLS regression.
We do not argue that a linear OLS is the best specification, but include it for expositional purposes. Figure 1 indicates that, on average, skip-row planting
tends to outperform conventionally-planted when
conventionally-planted yields are less than approximately 80-90 bu./acre, and vice-versa when yields
are above 80-90 bu./acre. This is indicated by the
intersection point of the dashed line and the solid
trend line. Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 2. Skip-row production has lower
yield variability (according to variance, semi-variance, and distances between quantiles), and outperforms conventional planting at quantiles below the
mean, and vice-versa above the mean.

Empirical Analysis

Figure 1. Corn Yield (bu./acre) Trial Data, Skip-Row vs. Conventional (Lyon et al. 2009)

The empirical analysis seeks to address three primary questions. First, which practice/technology
(skip-row or conventional) would be preferred in the
absence of insurance? Second, did the 2008 RMA insurance rules disincentivize the adoption of skiprow production? And third, are the practices suitably

2. We refer the interested reader to Lyon et al. (2009) for more in-depth details on the trial data.

S k i p -R o w C r o p I n s u r a n c e P r o g r a m D e s i g n , I n c e n t i v e E f f e c t s ,

similar to justify being combined as a single insurable practice as under the current rules, or should
they be maintained as separate insurable practices?
To address these questions, first a crop yield simulation model of skip-row and conventional yields is
developed. Next, an expected utility analysis is conducted to evaluate insurance and technology adoption choices.
Skip-Row Crop Yield Simulation Model
Empirical assessment of skip-row risk presents a
special challenge since the practice has only recently
been introduced to the region, and skip-row performance has not yet been observed over a large number of years in any single location. However, reliable
trial data do exist, which contain side-by-side comparisons of skip-row and conventionally-planted
yields over a wide range of weather outcomes and
regions. We develop a simulation to derive credible
skip-row distributions by combining information
from agronomic side-by-side trial data with a larger
farm-unit level dataset. By combining information
from the two datasets, more efficient estimates of
the skip-row distribution can be obtained. The trial
data are from Lyon et al. (2009) and span from 20042006 (N = 270). The larger dataset of conventional
yields is obtained from the RMA Type 15 producer
yield records, and consists of 130,080 conventional
corn yield observations from 1996-2008. The Type 15
database is the RMA database where producer-level
historical yields are maintained; they were provided
by RMA and deemed appropriate for use in this application. Unless otherwise noted, usage of the Type
15 yields are assumed to refer to detrended yields
in order to accurately account for technology gains
through time. The yield detrending process is detailed in the next section.
The simulation methodology employs a multivariate nonparametric simulation technique to derive augmented skip-row yield distributions, insurance rates, and to perform expected utility
analyses. The methodology involves several steps.
First, a nonparametric bivariate density of the difference between skip-row and conventional yields
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is constructed using the yield trial data to establish the relationship between skip-row and conventional yields. We augment the trial data with
the larger database of conventional yields by employing a resampling procedure, whereby a conventionally-planted yield is first sampled (based
on models calibrated with the Type 15 data), and
then a skip-row yield is constructed by simulating
a skip-row difference yield from the estimated bivariate density, conditional on the level of the conventional yield sampled from the Type 15 data.3 Explicitly,
the procedure is as follows. First, a variable is constructed for the difference between skip-row and
conventionally-planted yields using trial data as
xi = yiS – yiF ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, … N}, where i is the observation index, and yiS and yiF are paired skip-row and
convention yield observations from the trial data.
Alternatively, in matrix notation we have
xN × 1 = ySN × 1 – yFN × 1 ,
where for exposition we include the dimensions of
the matrices. Next, a bivariate density is constructed
of x = yS − yF and yF, f(x,yF ). Using this density, we
then construct the conditional density of f(x|yF ). With
this density in hand, conventional yield draws, ȳ T15,
are simulated from the empirical detrended yield
density from the Type 15 yield dataset, fˆ(yT15). Skiprow differences, x̄, are then simulated from fˆ(x|ȳ T15)
conditional on ȳ T15. Unit-level simulated skip-row
yields are then calculated as ȳ S = ȳ T15 + x̄ .
We estimate the joint density of x and yF, f(x,yF ) as
a bivariate Gaussian kernel density using a product
kernel and bandwidth, h1×2, as suggested by Bowman
and Azzalini (1997, p. 31).4 Letting
ZN×2 = [xN×1, yFN×1 ],
we can calculate the bandwidth as
1/

h1×2 = MED[|Z – REP[MED[Z],N,1]|] ∙ (0.6745 × N 6)–1,
where the matrix function REP[Z,N,M] is an N×M tiling of matrix Z, and the function MED[Z] results in
an N×1 vector with mth element equal to the median
of the mth column of Z. Next, the bivariate Gaussian
kernel density is estimated as

3. The primary advantage of our simulation approach is that it is not necessary that the marginal distribution of conventional yields from the trial
data be a “good” estimate of the underlying “true” marginal distribution, only that it suitably spans the support of the “true” marginal distribution, and that the data are extensible across the region as it regards impacts from management practices, soil characteristics, etc. From a statistical point of view, the only relevant information contained in the trial data is that which pertains to the relationship between skip-row and conventional yields, conditional on the conventional yield outcome. Indeed, the marginal distributions derived from the trial data are otherwise not
relevant, nor is it required that they be accurate depictions of the “true” underlying marginals in order to effectively implement our procedure.
In practice though, care should be taken to ensure that the data generated in the agronomic trials are representative of yields in the region.
4. We also investigated using a shaped multivariate normal kernel with bandwidth h = (4/5N)1/6 in lieu of the product kernel as outlined in Simar
and Wilson (1999), but found little practical difference in the results.
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N
fˆ(z1×2) = N–1 hι–1 ∑ K ((z – Zi)./h),
i=1

where

ι = [1,1]′,

Zi is the ith row of the original data, Z = [x, yF],
–t21

–t22

K([t1, t2]) = e 2 ∙ e 2
√ 2π
√ 2π

,

and “./” denotes element-by-element matrix division. The marginal density of yF is obtained by integrating out x as
∞
∞
fˆ(yF ) = ∫–∞ fˆ(z)dx = ∫–∞ fˆ([yF, x])dx.
Estimates of the conditional density of x conditional
on yF, fˆ(x|yF) can then be constructed using the definition of a conditional density. Note that this density
is used to simulate skip-row difference variables, x̄,
conditional on the simulated conventionally-planted
F
variates, ȳ , whereby the simulated conventionallyplanted conditioning yield will be drawn from the
empirical yield distribution from the larger dataset, ȳ
T15
(in our case, the Type 15 data). The simulated skiprow yield is then calculated as the sum of the simulated conventionally-planted conditioning yield and
the simulated skip-row difference yield to obtain
S
T15
+ x̄. Since the skip-row simulated yield is
ȳ = ȳ
bounded below at zero, we must truncate our condiF
tional distribution of x̄ from below at – ȳ to ensure
S
that ȳ is always greater than zero. Put simply, this
avoids drawing negative yields. This is accomplished
by employing the reflection method of Silverman as illustrated in Simar and Wilson (1999). The conditional
distribution of x on yF is itself a univariate distribution,
F
thus a reflection point is needed at – ȳ for x. The reflection method in this case with only a lower bound
F
is implemented by assigning a zero value to fˆ(x|ȳ )
F
when x is less than – ȳ ; and, when x is greater than
F
F
– ȳ , the density of fˆ(x| ȳ ) is equated to the untruncated density evaluated at x, plus the un-truncated density value evaluated at the reflected value of
F
F
x around −yF, or xr = – ȳ – (x – (– ȳ ). Thus we have
F

fˆ(x|ȳ ) =

{

if x < yF,

0

(

N
i=1

f (yF )–1 N–1 hι–1 ∑
+

N
∑
i=1

K ((z – Zi)./h)

K ((zr – Zi)./h)

)

otherwise
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where zr=[xr,yF]. The empirical distribution for drawing from the Type 15 data is constructed using the detrended yields as described below. We simulate 500
draws from the empirical distributions for each unit,
and then simulate 500 draws from the conditional
difference distribution in order to calculate simulated skip-row yields for each practice for each of the
farm units in the sample.5 ,6 Insurance loss costs, expected yields, risk measures, and expected utility for
each practice are then calculated using the simulated
draws.
Constructing Forward-looking Empirical Distributions of
Conventional Yields
To construct forward-looking conventional yield
distribution estimates from the Type 15 data for use
in the crop yield simulation model above, yields
from the Type 15 data are first detrended to account
for technological advances through time. The resulting yields deviations from trends are then used to
construct empirical farm-unit level yield distributions. The fact that the typical farm-unit yield series in these data are short (10 years or less)–coupled with the frequent presence of total yield losses
in the Central Great Plains region–render farm-unit
level OLS trend estimation unattractive. The typical approach to increasing the estimation efficiency
in this case is to pool units together and then estimate trends for some region or group of similar units. This allows for a reduction in the impact
of sampling variability on estimated trends (Atwood, Shaik, and Watts 2003). One typical manner in which this is implemented is to estimate
county-level trends and then apply the estimated
county trend to detrend the farm-level unit yields.
This caˆˆn be justified with the reasoning that farms
within a county are typically subject to similar technology trends and climactic conditions, and thus
pooling can increase estimation efficiency with little
risk of inducing bias. Thus, we utilize county-level
yields when detrending. Specifically, county level
yields from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) are used to estimate robust trends using data from 1972-2008. The basic concepts underlying this approach are well-established (see e.g.
Atwood, Shaik, and Watts 2003; Woodard, Sherrick,
and Schnitkey 2011).

5. We assessed the impact of using a sample size of 5,000 versus 500 for one of the coverage level/plant configurations combinations. The difference at the farm-unit level was negligible, and the difference for the county level summaries of the 40,336 farm-unit level simulations was essentially zero. This was not surprising, given that Latin Hypercube sampling was employed.
6. The Mersenne-Twister algorithm is employed to generate the uniform variates needed for the inverse transform sampling. Latin Hypercube
sampling is employed to increase simulation sampling efficiency. Descriptions of these well-established methods can be found in most elementary simulation textbooks.
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A feature of county-level yields in this region is
that there is extreme volatility in yields from year-toyear, and the occurrence of near-total loss years can
potentially create outlier problems. To address this issue, we employ a robust Iterative Reweighted Least
Squares Huber Estimator when estimating the trend.
With the trend estimate in hand, we can then obtain
detrended unit-level yields as
Tr

ytT15 = ytuT15 ×

Y 2009
Tr

Yt

Tr

where Yt = β̂1 + β̂2t is the county trend yield in year t,
uT15

yt

is the trended farm-unit level conventional yield
Tr

from the Type-15 data, Yt is the fitted county yield
from the regression of time on NASS yields (i.e. the
“trend yield”), t is the year, and β’s are coefficients
to be estimated from the regression of time on NASS
county yields. In our case, the Type 15 data contain historical yields from 1996-2008 at the farm-unit
level. Thus, to construct estimates of the 2009 conventional yield distributions, yields are detrended
to 2009. Note that this detrending method implicitly
assumes constant relative yield risk growth through
time. As Woodard (2008) and Woodard, Sherrick,
and Schnitkey (2011) point out, this assumption is
consistent with RMA’s loss cost system requirements and assumptions. The high frequency of total yield loss events in this region suggests that this
assumption is likely reasonable for this application.
Assuming other forms of yield risk or yield trend
form would impact the nominal estimated rate and
loss levels for skip-row and conventionally-planted
production, but should not change the results concerning the relative relationships between skip-row
and conventional yields significantly.
Estimation of Insurance Loss Costs
Since adopting skip-row practices has a primary
impact on the yield loss component, we restrict attention to the traditional APH yield insurance product in the insurance analysis. As noted, we simulate
T15
yield observations of ȳ
and x̄ from fˆ(yT15) and
fˆ(x| ȳ

T15

), then calculate simulated skip-row yields
T15
S
T15
+ x̄. Thus, we can
conditional on ȳ
as ȳ = ȳ
calculate loss cost in a particular case for the standard
yield insurance, as well as expected loss costs as,

and

LC =
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Max(0, APH × Cover – ỹ)
(APH × Cover),

and
I

E(LC) =

∑ i=1 Max(0, APH × Cover – yi)
APH × Cover × I

where I is the number of yields available (or simulated), APH is the unit APH, yi is the simulated yield
outcome (skip-row or conventional), and Cover is the
(%) coverage level.
Expected Utility Analysis
To investigate the impacts of various insurance
program designs on skip-row adoption in an economic framework, we conduct an expected utility
analysis using the simulated yields obtained from the
crop simulation model described above. Since production costs for skip-row and conventional are typically similar, we focus on the expected utility of crop
revenues net of insurance costs (price normalized).
Actuarially fair insurance costs are estimated from
the simulation model for skip-row and conventional
planting practices, where the indemnity function for
the yield-based insurance is defined above.7 The analysis adjusts farmer-paid premiums using the current subsidy structure as published by RMA. Following Holt and Laury (2002), we adopt a power utility
function. This utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and can be expressed as
U(x)=x1−r/(1−r), where x is the relevant return (revenue plus any insurance indemnity) net of insurance
costs, and r is the risk aversion coefficient. Expected
utility can then be calculated as
∞
EU = ∫0 U(x)dG(x),
where G(x) is the distribution of returns from the simulation model. Results are presented at the 85% coverage level for a representative producer in Thomas,
Kansas at various levels of risk aversion as characterized by Holt and Laury (2002).
Expected utility is evaluated over four different
scenarios for both conventional and skip-row practices: (1) no insurance, (2) insurance under 2008 rules,
(3) insurance under 2009/current rules, and (4) insurance under our proposed rules. Recall that under 2008 RMA rules, skip-row producers without es-

7. While revenue insurance is also popular in this region, we focus the analysis on a yield-based insurance product in order to maintain focus on
the component impacted by skip-row adoption (i.e. yields). The results likely hold similarly for revenue products, however, since skip-row and
conventional yields are highly correlated.

832

Woodard

et al. in

American Journal

of

A g r i c u l t u r a l E c o n o m i c s 94 (2012)

Figure 2. Joint Distribution of x = yS − yF and yF (N = 270)

tablished databases received effectively one-half of
the T-yield APH for insurance purposes, and the insurance cost was also one-half the conventional premium.8 Under the current 2009 RMA rules, skip-row
is combined with conventional production for insurance purposes, and also is charged the same rate.
Thus, new skip-row producers will receive an APH
equal to their conventional APH, and also receive the
established conventional yield premium rate. Based
on previous research about skip-row yields in this
region–which suggests that skip-row in this region
has a higher expected yield and lower risk/expected
loss costs than conventional–we propose an alternative set of rules which would establish skip-row
and conventional as separate practices with separate
rates and APH databases. In the analysis, the insurance premium rate and APH’s are determined by the
expected loss cost (minus subsidy) and the expected
yield from the simulated yields, respectively.
Results — Distribution and Expected Loss Cost
Impacts of Skip-Row Technologies
Figure 2 presents the truncated joint distribution of x and yF estimated from the trial data. As ev-

idenced by Figures 1 and 2, the data cover a large
spectrum of possible outcomes. In general, the difference between skip-row and conventional production increases as the conventionally-planted yield increases, which is consistent with previous research.
However, there is still some variability in the relationship between skip-row and conventional production over different events. Thus, in regions with
high frequencies of yields below 80-90 bu./acre,
more mass will be contained further away from
zero for skip-row relative to conventional cropping.
As noted by Lyon et al. (2009), the expected value
of skip-row yields exceeds that of conventionallyplanted when conventionally-planted yields are less
than approximately 80-90 bu./acre. This does not
imply that skip-row yields will always exceed those
of conventionally-planted yields when conventionally-planted yields are below 80 bu./acre, but only
on average. The nature of the bivariate joint density
explicitly takes this into account.
To illustrate the impact of skip-row in terms of the
simulated augmented distribution, Figure 3 presents kernel distributions from the simulated values
for skip-row and conventional yields for Thomas
County, Kansas, a high production county. Figure 3

8. We proxy the T-Yield and the conventionally-planted APH by the expected conventional fully-planted yield from the simulations.
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Figure 3. Simulated Augmented Yield CDF’s, Thomas KS

Figure 4. Ratio of Expected Yield, Skip-Row to Conventional

illustrates that density is redistributed closer to the
mean for skip-row, and that skip-row also has less
density far out in the tails. This is a result of the fact
that there is a high frequency of total loss (or neartotal loss) events for conventional yields in this
county. Also, the conventionally-planted distributions have more mass at higher yield levels, an effect
attributable to the fact that conventionally-planted
yields tend to outperform skip-row when conventionally-planted yields are above 80-90 bu./acre.
Figure 4 presents a map of the ratio of skip-row and
regular planted expected yields. As the Figure illustrates, in the eastern region, skip-row and conventional production performed similarly in terms
of expected yield (with skip-row modestly outperforming); in the western region, skip-row tended
to significantly outperform (30% to 50% higher expected yield in some counties). This result is somewhat expected since this region tends to be more

drought-prone, and has lower expected yields (map
not presented).
To assess the impact of skip-row patterns on expected insurance losses, the average simulated insurance loss costs (expressed as a percentage of the liability, or bu./acre coverage) are estimated using the
simulation procedure described.9 Table 3 reports results for the expected loss cost analysis for skip-row
and conventionally-planted yields at different coverage levels, aggregated over all units in the region.10
The first block column of results in Table 3 report
conventionally-planted expected loss costs at each
coverage level; the second block column reports skiprow loss costs, and contains three individual sub-columns, one for each of the three methods for determining skip-row APH: (1) T-Yield APH (reflecting
2008 rules), (2) Conventional Planted Expected yield
(reflecting 2009 and current rules), and (3) Skip-Row
Expected Yield (reflecting proposed rules).

9. The county expected unit loss costs generated from the simulations should not be construed as final rates for FCIC premium determination
purposes. In practice, RMA makes several adjustments to base loss costs/rates, and also implements specific weightings both across units and
across years. We do not replicate all of those steps, nor is doing so necessary to evaluate the impacts of skip-row which are of interest here.
10. Our results were consistent across all seed densities and skip-row planting configurations regarding rankings relative to conventionallyplanted practices (results not reported). Please see Lyon et al. (2009) for a discussion of planting configurations and seed densities used in the
trials.
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Table 3. Simulated Expected Loss Costs - Average of All Units/Counties
Practice →

Conventional

Skip-Row

APH
Determination
→

ConventionallyPlanted Expected
Yield

T-Yield
(2008 Rules)

30.20%
29.18%
28.17%
27.19%
26.20%
25.22%
24.25%
23.28%

11.35%
10.65%
9.95%
9.24%
8.54%
7.82%
7.11%
6.40%

Coverage
Level

85%
80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%

In general, loss costs are substantially lower for
skip-row production. The corresponding conventionally-planted yield expected loss cost was typically
about 50% to 100% in excess of that for skip-row.
For example, the skip-row rate (under the conventional APH, sub-column 2) at 85% (50%) coverage
is approximately 19.65% (11.31%), versus a rate of
30.20% (23.28%) for conventional production. Skiprow rates (i.e. loss costs) were slightly higher for the
skip-row adjusted APH (sub-column 3), versus under the conventional APH (sub-column 2), reflecting
the fact that the skip-row expected yield was higher
than the conventionally-planted, on average, in the
sample. However, it was still much less than the loss
cost for conventional practices. This finding suggests
that even if skip-row APH’s are allowed to adjust upward over time in a combined practice insurance program (as under the current rules), producers adopting skip-row cropping will still receive rates that
are too high since they are lower than conventional
yield loss costs. Recall that under the 2008 rules, new
skip-row producers effectively received a fraction of
the quoted T-Yield as their yield guarantee (approximately 50%) because of the manner in which FSA
factors were used to determine acreage. To illustrate
what the expected impacts were from imposing this
deflated T-Yield as the APH for skip-row under the
2008 rules, the first sub-column under skip-row presents expected loss costs using the T-Yield and FSA
planted acreage factors when calculating indemnities.
The results of our study imply that rates for skiprow are massively overpriced relative to conventional
practices at all given levels of coverage. This is somewhat expected, though since under the 2008 rules, a
skip-row producer effectively received a fraction of

ConventionallyPlanted Expected
Yield (Current Rules)
19.65%
18.43%
17.22%
16.03%
14.85%
13.67%
12.49%
11.31%

Skip-Row
Expected Yield
(Proposed Rules)
23.23%
21.86%
20.49%
19.13%
17.78%
16.42%
15.05%
13.68%

the coverage that would have been provided for conventionally-planted (as determined by the FSA factor) at a fraction of the rate. However, generally there
is not a one-to-one proportional tradeoff between the
coverage level and the expected loss rate. For example, suppose the published conventional planted rate
was estimated as 30.20% (as a percentage of liability).
If this were the rate charged on conventional production, then producers would pay a rate of 15.10%
for insuring skip-row cropping. Yet, the expected
loss cost for a skip-row producer in this case was
only 6.40% (not 15.10%), nearly 60% less than the expected loss cost of 15.10%. Thus, not only was coverage availability severely restricted relative to conventional under the 2008 rules, but the rates were also
severely inflated for any effective level of coverage
for skip-row production.
In order to assess spatial patterns in the results,
Figure 5 presents a map of the ratio of skip-row to
conventionally-planted production expected loss
costs for the 85% coverage level product when the
conventionally-planted APH is employed for both.
The simulated average unit-level loss costs are averaged together at the county level of aggregation for
exposition. The figures suggest substantial heterogeneity in the relationship between skip-row and conventional insurance loss rates across the region. All of
the counties have lower expected skip-row loss costs
than their conventionally-planted counterparts when
using the conventionally-planted APH (Figure 5).
However, the expected difference is smaller in the
high-yielding eastern region, as expected. This indicates that, (relative to a given level of bu./acre coverage) skip-row was always less risky by this metric.
Some regions have expected positive rate differen-
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Figure 5. Ratio of Expected Loss Costs, Skip-Row to Conventional (Conventional APH, 85% Coverage Level)

tials between skip-row and conventional expected
loss costs, while others have negative differentials
when using an adjusted skip-row APH for skip-row
insurance (map not presented). This indicates that
as APH’s adjust to reflect skip-row average production capacity, the expected loss rates for skip-row and
conventional production will not necessarily converge. The implication is that the 2009 rules will not
result in equal expected loss rates for skip-row and
conventionally-planted crops, even after APH’s have
adjusted. Thus, initially we would expect all regions
to have significantly lower expected loss rates for
skip-row cropping if the conventional APH is applied
for both. Thus, combining both practices into the
same insurance program as under the current rules is
probably not warranted.
Overall, we find consistent evidence that adopting skip-row cropping will result in lower yield risk
(relative to a given level of bu./acre coverage) and
higher average yields. These results suggest that
RMA should do one of two things, either (1) consider insuring skip-row and conventionally-planted
crops separately, and maintain them as separate insurable practices (similar to how non-irrigated and
irrigated practices are maintained separately), including keeping separate APH records, and maintaining separate rates and T-Yields, or (2) that RMA
implement rate and APH corrections for the proportion of acreage in the insurable unit allocated to
skip-row so that the effective coverage levels and
rates charged reflect the actual production capabilities and risks of the practices appropriately. Failure
to modify the current rules may incentivize producers to not adopt skip-row production in cases where
they otherwise might if the provisions for insurance
were fair across practices, or if no insurance existed.
We investigate this further in the expected utility
analysis in the next section.

Results - Expected Utility Analysis and Technology
Adoption
Table 4 presents results for expected net returns,
risk (LPM), and expected utility of returns for conventional and skip-row practices under various insurance regimes for a representative producer in
Thomas, Kansas. Four scenarios are evaluated: no
insurance, insurance under the 2008 rules, insurance under the current rules, and insurance under
the proposed rules. Recall that net returns are calculated as the yield plus any insurance indemnities,
minus insurance costs (net of premium subsidy),
and results are presented for 85% coverage level insurance. Table 4 summarizes the expected utility
maximizing technology choice (skip-row or conventional) in each case.
Under no insurance, skip-row has both a higher
expected return and greater expected utility than
conventional production, as well as lower risk. Under
the 2008 rules, however, the insured skip-row net return had both a lower return and higher risk than an
insured conventional crop. This reflects the fact that
coverage was restricted for skip-row relative to conventional (and had an inflated premium) under those
rules due to the use of FSA factoring, and also that
the rules were inhibiting the adoption of skip-row
production. Similar results are found under current
insurance rules. While the insured risk for skip-row
cropping is slightly lower than insured conventional,
the expected return and expected utility are also
lower, reflecting the fact that skip-row expected
loss costs are lower than conventional; yet they receive the same premium rate as conventional cropping under current rules. This result was consistent
for expected utility across all reasonable levels of risk
aversion, and indicates that an expected utility maximizing producer would typically adopt conventional

This table presents expected utility (EU) at various levels of risk-aversion under alternative insurance regimes for a representative producer in Thomas, KS, with utility
function U(x)=x(1−r)/(1−r). Risk aversion parameters/characterizations are from Holt and Laury (2002). The preferred technology (skip-row or conventional) for each
combination is in bold.

−0.5802
−0.5930
−1.0253
r = 1.37 (very highly risk-averse)

−0.7139

−0.5930

−0.6642

−0.5930

−0.5930

−2.8945
−2.9217
−3.4980
r = 1.17 (highly risk-averse)

−3.1164

−2.9217

−3.0613

−2.9217

−2.9225

11.9068
11.8093

14.9618
14.6918

11.8093

11.7979

13.5137

11.3588
11.8093

14.6918

10.7342
r = 0.825 (very risk-averse)

13.7565
12.7522
r = 0.545 (risk-averse)

11.3479

14.6918

14.6314

29.3156
28.6249
28.3654
25.1607
r = 0.28 (slightly risk-averse)

26.8540

28.6249

25.6654

28.6249

68.8492
67.7114
68.8492
60.8927
68.8492
65.6956
62.7806

Risk Aversion								

r = 0 (risk neutral)

Skip-Row
Conventional
Skip-Row
Conventional
Skip-Row
Conventional
Skip-Row
Conventional
Planting Practice →

Current RMA Rules
(pooled insurance)
2008 RMA Rules
(pooled insurance)
No Insurance

Table 4. Expected Utility under Various Insurance Regimes

70.6361

Woodard

Proposed Rules
(separate insurance)
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planting under current insurance rules. Last, under
the proposed rules, insured skip-row planting has
both higher expected utility and a higher expected return than conventional production, as well as lower
risk. Thus, an expected utility maximizing producer
would adopt skip-row under the proposed rules. We
believe that the proposed rules would be the most
actuarially appropriate, as the 2008 and current insurance rules were both shown to (1) incorrectly reflect skip-row production potential in APH’s, and (2)
overcharge for skip-row insurance relative to a given
bu./acre level of coverage for conventional planting.
The expected utility analysis also indicates that the
new proposed rules would not disincentivize skiprow adoption, whereas the existing rules do.
Conclusion
This study investigates the performance of skiprow corn planting in the Central Great Plains by developing a multivariate nonparametric simulation
technique that allows yield trial data to be efficiently
combined with larger existing databases of yields in
order to derive augmented skip-row yield distributions and insurance rates using the conditional distribution generated from the trial data. The results
suggest that skip-row corn planting embodies both
higher average productivity and lower risk in this region. The expected impacts of skip-row adoption on
loss rates are quite large, with 100% differences between conventional and skip-row loss rates appearing to be typical. The implication is that skip-row
corn in this region embodies an essentially different
set of risks than conventional practices, suggesting
that separate insurance programs for skip-row and
conventional crops may be warranted. Overall, the
results indicate that under the 2008 rules, and even
under the current rules, skip-row adoption is likely to
be crowded out due to the unfair provision of insurance across practices, whereas it otherwise would be
optimal to adopt if no insurance were available, or if
a coherent insurance program were in place.
We acknowledge that the implied insurance loss
cost differences suggested by this study are large.
While those presented are the best estimates of the
actuarially fair rate differentials based on available data, and while it is conceivable that the actual
rate adjustments may indeed be this large, we caution that they are based mainly on trial data–the 270
yield trial observations from Lyon et al. (2009)–and
thus in practice may lack the proper credibility for a
full and immediate rate adjustment. In practice, skip-
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row planting could initially employ the conventional
planted insurance rate and APH, along with modest
rate and APH adjustments, which could be updated
through time as more data become available. Nevertheless, the results of this analysis and other research
appear to provide a sound basis for splitting skiprow and conventional planting practices into separate
insurable practices. Thus, future research should focus on continued evaluation of skip-row performance
in the Central Great Plains.
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